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Abstract 
 
Washington Safety Management Solutions, LLC developed web-based software to improve the 
efficiency and consistency of hazard identification and analysis, control selection and 
classification, and to standardize analysis reporting at Savannah River Site. 
 
In the new nuclear age, information technology provides methods to improve the efficiency of 
the documented safety analysis development process which includes hazard analysis activities. 
This software provides a web interface that interacts with a relational database to support 
analysis, record data, and to ensure reporting consistency. 
 
A team of subject matter experts participated in a series of meetings to review the associated 
processes and procedures for requirements and standard practices. Through these meetings, a set 
of software requirements were developed and compiled into a requirements traceability matrix 
from which software could be developed. The software was tested to ensure compliance with the 
requirements. Training was provided to the hazard analysis leads. Hazard analysis teams using 
the software have verified its operability. The software has been classified as NQA-1, Level D, 
as it supports the analysis team but does not perform the analysis. The software can be 
transported to other sites with alternate risk schemes. 
 
The software is being used to support the development of 14 hazard analyses. User responses 
have been positive with a number of suggestions for improvement which are being incorporated 
as time permits. The software has enforced a uniform implementation of the site procedures. The 
software has significantly improved the efficiency and standardization of the hazard analysis 
process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Software applications such as Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, and Corel Word Perfect are 
often used to support the documentation of a Hazard Analysis (HA). However, these applications 
were not developed to support hazard analysis. Therefore, the primary tools used for HA lack the 
capabilities and features necessary to efficiently produce an HA and ensure its consistency. 
 
Inefficiency occurs when humans manually perform repetitive actions, rely on their memory, and 
manually extract data from one report to generate another report. 
 
Inconsistencies occur when the same concept is repeated but stated in multiple ways or in 
activities such as manually recording and maintaining risk rankings (e.g., high frequency with 
high consequences results in an A1 risk ranking). 
 
HA and Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) data is strongly related. Identification of hazards 
and their locations is directly related to the identification of events. Data such as causes, 
locations, Material at Risk (MAR), assumptions, and controls are then related to each event. The 
events are prevented or mitigated through the application of controls. This information is then 
discussed in DSA Chapter 3, “Hazard and Accident Analyses,” Chapter 4, “Safety Structures, 
Systems, and Components,” Chapter 5, “Derivation of Technical Safety Requirements,” and the 
Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). While word processors are excellent for writing DSAs 
and TSRs, a relational database is a better tool for developing the data that will be presented in 
those documents. 
 
Therefore, Washington Safety Management Solutions (WSMS), LLC, developed software to 
support HA, DSA and TSR development at Savannah River Site (SRS). This software package 
has been titled, “electronic Consolidated Hazard Analysis Process,” (eCHAP). 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
WSMS encountered several events which prompted reconsideration of the software used to 
document our HAs. The process relied on an engineer recording HA data in Microsoft Word 
tables. While Word and Excel have some powerful features; these features were not developed 
from the perspective of supporting hazard analysis. Therefore, Word and Excel do not support 
the efficient use of an engineer’s time. 
 
Consider two (2) cases. 
 
1. Using Word an engineer searches an HA table, either manually or using the Find feature, 
to find the previous occurrence of a MAR, cause, control, etc. If and when they find it, 
they copy the information, scroll to their previous location in the table and paste that 
information into the table. If they don’t find it, they will type in what they remembered 
which leads to inconsistencies. 
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2. An engineer is asked to extract information from an HA table to construct another table 
(e.g., a list of controls and their related events). 
 
Both of these cases require an inefficient use of an engineer’s time. In the first case, a short 
period (seconds to minutes) repeated many times during HA development. In the second case, a 
significant time period (hours) to find, extract, and reassemble the data. In the second case, if the 
data in the HA table changes then the second table needs to be manually updated. 
 
In the first case above, the introduction of inconsistencies was mentioned. With a word 
processor, one is not able to easily view variations from the perspective of “what did the 
engineer mean.”  For instance, the following attributes were listed within the same HA: 
 
• Identifies tritium presence inside container 
• Identifies tritium quantity inside the container 
 
In this case, a reviewer must determine if these are the same concept (i.e., tritium exists within 
the container) or there are two concepts (i.e., presence of tritium within the container in the first 
case and how much tritium is within the container in the second case). If the information were 
presented in the same location, the analyst could be prompted to consider the potential ambiguity 
so that the statements may be refined or to replace one statement with the other. 
 
In order to address these types of issues, WSMS assembled a team of experts to assess the SRS 
HA, DSA, and TSR development processes, identify requirements, and establish design criteria 
for software development. eCHAP was then developed, tested and deployed and has been in use 
since the summer of 2007. The primary input source for the eCHAP design was DOE-STD-
3009-94, Change Notice No. 3, “Preparation Guide for U.S Department of Energy Nonreactor 
Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses.” Interpretation of this standard was influenced by 
SRS guidance such as WSRC-SCD-11, Revision 5, “Consolidated Hazard Analysis Process 
Programs and Methods,” and WSRC Manual E7, “Conduct of Engineering and Technical 
Support Procedure Manual,” Procedure 2.25, “Functional Classifications.” 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
eCHAP is designed to support the development of DSAs and TSRs beginning with a facility’s 
HA. Within eCHAP there are seven (7) basic steps as follows: 
 
1. Define risk scheme 
2. Event identification  
3. Standard hazard identification 
4. Hazard review 
5. Event bounding evaluation 
6. Credited control evaluation 
7. Credited control specification 
 
WSRC-MS-2008-00021
Step 1 
 
The first step requires defining the means for categorizing and ranking a facility’s hazards. A 
site or facility will have manuals and/or procedures that define their risk parameters. A 
Configuration Control Board (CCB) is responsible for interpreting that guidance, preparing 
and then publishing approved risk schemes within eCHAP. 
 
Within eCHAP, a risk scheme (Figure 1 - Risk Parameters) is required to be defined prior to 
the start of an analysis. A risk scheme defines the acronyms to be used for frequency (e.g., 
Anticipated [A], Unlikely [U], Extremely Unlikely [EU], Beyond Extremely Unlikely 
[BEU]), consequences (e.g., High [H], Moderate [M], Low [L], Negligible [N]), hazard types 
(e.g., Radiological, Chemical, Physical), receptors (e.g., Immediate Worker [IW], Collocated 
Worker [CW], Maximally exposed Off-site Individual [MOI]), and risk ranks (e.g., A, B, C, 
D). These acronyms are used to assemble risk matrices (frequency versus consequence) for 
each receptor and hazard type (Figure 2 - Risk Matrices). While most of the risk matrices are 
the same, the software was designed for maximum flexibility in defining risk schemes. 
 
The risk scheme also specifies data such as TSR types (e.g., Limiting Condition for 
Operation [LCO], Administrative Control [AC], Design Feature [DF]), functional 
classification (e.g., Safety-Class [SC], Safety-Significant [SS]), and event types (e.g., fire 
[E-1], explosion [E-2], loss of confinement [E-3]) [Figure 3 - Supporting Details]. 
 
Step 2 
 
The second step is event identification which is the core of the hazard analysis. Within this 
section, the analyst identifies the various event scenarios, estimates unmitigated 
consequences, identifies defense in depth controls, and then identifies the proposed credited 
controls (Figure 4 - Hazard Table). 
 
eCHAP provides a generic hazard evaluation table. This table provides the analyst the means 
to create events and to specify information related to the event itself. Provision is made for 
replicating events (i.e., making a complete copy of an event for modification), copying 
events (i.e., copy specific components of one event to another), and searching events for 
specific information. 
 
Information that is displayed in columns having a yellow background can be directly 
modified by the analyst. A double-click in the column or clicking its heading opens a screen 
to permit editing of the information. The analyst can then save the information or cancel the 
operation and return to the event detail screen. 
 
Efficiency and consistency is obtained by storing information and making it available to the 
analyst for reuse. For instance, clicking on the Locations column opens a screen (Figure 5 - 
Event Type Detail) that shows the locations currently related to the particular event. Icons are 
provided to permit the user to add new locations and relate them to this event or to link 
existing (stored) locations to this event (Figure 6 - Location Linking). Currently linked 
locations are designated with a check and any other previously identified locations are also 
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listed. The analyst can add or remove links by checking or unchecking the boxes and clicking 
the save button.
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Figure 1 - Risk Parameters. 
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Figure 2 - Risk Matrices. 
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Figure 3 - Supporting Details. 
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Figure 4 - Hazard Table. 
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Figure 5 - Event Type Detail. 
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Figure 6 - Location Linking.
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This storage and linking capability helps both the efficiency and consistency of HAs. Any 
previously stored data is available for reuse without the need to “search the table” for the 
desired information. Additionally, once the information is stored, then the analyst can relate 
that information to one or more events and the information is always stated the same. This 
same capability is available for most of the data such as MAR, causes, release mechanisms, 
references, and assumptions. 
 
Unmitigated frequency and consequences (Figure 7 - Event Evaluation Detail) must be 
specified by the analyst. The frequency and consequence acronyms identified in the risk 
scheme are available for the analyst’s selection. eCHAP uses the analyst’s selections to 
determine the risk ranking for each specific hazard type and receptor in accordance with the 
risk matrices that were established in the risk scheme. Therefore, if a frequency or 
consequence is changed at a later date then the applicable risk ranking is automatically 
updated to reflect the user’s changes. 
 
Returning to Figure 4 - Hazard Table, this screen also provides the analyst the means to 
identify new controls or to select previously stored controls. Two stacked columns are 
provided to display the preventive engineered and administrative controls and another two 
stacked columns are provided to display the mitigative preventive and administrative 
controls. 
 
eCHAP provides the analyst the means to add and remove controls from the event and to 
further specify their application (Figure 8 - Edit CHA Event Related Control). New controls 
are stored for linking to other events. The specific details of a control may vary with the 
event to which it is applied so eCHAP provides this capability. For instance, a control may be 
identified as safety-significant for one event because of that event’s consequences. For an 
event with low or negligible consequences that same control could be linked without the 
safety-significant designation. 
 
The first blue background column displays any controls that the analyst selects as safety-
class or safety-significant controls for this event. A second blue background column displays 
the resulting mitigated consequences for this event. The data in these two blue columns is 
affected by analyst selections in the yellow background columns (i.e., unmitigated frequency, 
consequences, and controls). 
 
Step 3 
 
The third step, as currently configured in eCHAP, is hazard identification. Here the analyst 
relates each MAR and cause identified to a standard hazards list (Figure 9 - Hazard 
Identification). This configuration will be modified in the future such that hazard 
identification is a precursor to HA. The purpose here is to relate each cause or MAR to one 
or more standard hazards. Step 4 will use this information to ensure that the complete 
spectrum of events has been analyzed.
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Figure 7 - Event Evaluation Detail. 
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Figure 8 - Edit CHA Event Related Control. 
WSRC-MS-2008-00021
 
Figure 9 - Hazard Identification. 
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Step 4 
 
The fourth step is hazard review. Here the analyst can review the data assembled during 
Step 3 above to verify that the entire spectrum of events has been addressed. This screen 
(Figure 10 – Hazard) will indicate all the hazards that have been developed into at least one 
event and will also indicate the hazards that have not been developed (Figure 11 - Hazards 
without Related Events). The hazards which have not been related can be reviewed for 
applicability, standard industrial hazard, or the need to develop an event to address the 
hazard. 
 
Step 5 
 
The fifth step is event bounding evaluation (Figure 12 - Event Bounding Evaluation). Using 
this screen, the analyst can review all the events of a specific event type (e.g., fire, explosion) 
against all the other events of the same type. The analyst can determine if the event of 
interest, event in top portion of screen, is “bounded” by any of the events in the lower portion 
of the screen. The analyst must consider both the consequences and the control sets of both 
events. If the analyst determines that the event of interest is “bounded” by the other event, the 
analyst sets the “Bounded By” drop-down to the other event and documents their decision. 
The analyst completes this exercise for each event. 
 
The consequences of the “bounding” event should bind the consequences of the events which 
it bounds. However, the control sets may not be the same. Therefore, the control sets should 
be reviewed to ensure that the bounding event control set binds the control sets of the 
bounded events. If the control set is not bounded, then the event is not bounded. 
 
Step 6 
 
The sixth step is credited control evaluation (Figure 13 - Credited Control Specification). The 
purpose of this exercise is to examine the credited controls for their susceptibility to failure. 
Controls that are susceptible to failure may need to be replaced with a less susceptible control 
or the control may need one or more other controls to lessen the susceptibility of the control. 
For instance, a tank may be credited for containing waste material. If the tank is considered 
to be susceptible to failure, then an additional tank inspection program may be appropriate. 
The software would provide the means to quickly add the inspection program to the overall 
control set. 
 
Step 7 
 
The seventh step is credited control specification (Figure 14 - Credited Control 
Specification). The purpose here is to review the controls that have been selected in order to 
identify where and how the controls will be discussed in the DSA and the TSRs. A basic 
outline of these chapters, or sections thereof, can be generated from this data. Each outline 
would be provided to the DSA and TSR writers for preparation of their documents. 
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Figure 10 – Hazards with Related Events. 
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Figure 11 - Hazards without Related Events. 
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Figure 12 - Event Bounding Evaluation. 
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Figure 13 - Credited Control Specification. 
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Figure 14 - Credited Control Specification. 
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Since data is stored during the entire development process then the analyst can “review” specific 
sets of data and remove any identified inconsistencies. The Event Data Cleanup screen (Figure 
15 - Event Data Cleanup) provides the means to do this. In this example, a portion of the various 
identified causes are listed. The analyst can review these causes and replace duplicates or similar 
causes with one cause of the analyst’s choosing. The analyst can then remove the unused causes 
from the file. 
 
This process improves the consistency of the document and the method improves the efficiency 
of finding and correcting these inconsistencies. eCHAP was designed with the intent of being 
adaptable to various risk schemes such that the same software could handle performance of HAs 
at multiple DOE sites. In addition, minimal effort would be required to set up another DOE site 
with eCHAP that would interact with their computer servers. 
 
eCHAP provides a tool for recording the data derived during the HA process and does not 
perform any calculations on that data. Similar to a Microsoft Word or Excel table, the analyst is 
responsible for the data reported from the software. Therefore, eCHAP has been designated as 
NQA-1, Level D. 
 
eCHAP is web-based and therefore, information security was considered in its development. The 
eCHAP database is maintained on a secure server and is user name and password protected. 
 
Multiple users can simultaneously access eCHAP. The web-site provides simple access and use 
of HA data from multiple secure locations. User feedback is captured in the database which is 
then used to enhance the product over time. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The HA process and the incorporation of that data into DSAs and TSRs has been an inefficient 
process that contains inconsistencies in large respect due to the tools (i.e., Microsoft Word or 
Excel) being used.  In addition, without a standard platform for performing HAs, analysts tend to 
develop unique patterns and characteristics in the performance and documentation of their work. 
To alleviate these issues, a team of experts was selected to review the various criteria and 
established requirements. Software was developed in accordance with these requirements, tested, 
and released for use at SRS. While various issues are being worked, eCHAP has received praise 
and recognition for improving the HA process.
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Figure 15 - Event Data Cleanup. 
WSRC-MS-2008-00021
